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BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS
• IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY

199.99%

<

billion

by Alfred F. Conard
Henry M. Butzel Professor
The University of Michigan
[Delivered at the Second Regional Symposium
on Structure and Governance of Corporations, sponsored by The American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee
on Continuing Professional Education, Sea
Island, Georgia, December 1, 1977.]
The Societal Takeover
If Ben Franklin and Tom Jefferson could be with us today, I don't think they would be astounded by the executive jet that flew us here from Atlanta. I expect that
Jefferson would pull a couple of sketches out of his saddlebag to show that he was thinking of a lighter-than-air
machine to move tobacco from Charlottesville to Newport News. Ben would say it was in the back of his mind
when he flew his kite. But I think they would be really
amazed to discover how the life of America-its means
Aof eating, clothing and sheltering itself, its workways and
9work places, its culture and ideals-has come to be
centered around the institution of the business corporation.
The business corporation was a phenomenon seldom
encountered by the founding fathers, probably seen
about as often as elephants and giraffes. Williston
counted seven in existence before the U.S. constitution.
He certainly overlooked some, but incorporation was so
rare in governmental activities of the time that it was not
even mentioned in the U.S. constitution. The 18th century books on "corporations" dealt primarily with
municipal and ecclesiastical corporations, not business
corporations. A strict constructionist might argue from
this that the power to regulate in corporations was reserved to the states, but a more plausible inference is
that it was conceived of as one of the tools-like licensing, or prohibiting-by which powers such as the interstate commerce power and the currency power should
be exercised.
Adam Smith, who declared the principles of economic
freedom in the same year in which the Continental
Congress proclaimed political freedom, had no more
conception of the future role of business corporations
than did the colonial bumpkins. His principal discussion
of business corporations-which he called "joint stock
companies"-is found in his book on The Revenue of
Sovereign, under the heading, "Of Public Works and
Institutions which are necessary for facilitating particular Branches of Commerce." He is emphatic about
the inferiority of corporations to individual proprietorships. "Negligence and profusion" he says, " ... must
always prevail in the management of the affairs of such a
company."
In contrast to their insignificance in the world of the
founding fathers, business corporations are the biggest
institutions in American life today. Their
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revenues-roughly equivalent to the money they
handle-amounted in 1970, to about $1.7 trillion, out of
total business income of about $2 trillion. This was about
eight times the federal government revenue of about
$200 billion, and about five times the total federal, state
and local government revenues of about $350 billion.
Total educational expenditures in 1970 amounted to
about $70 billion, or four percent of corporate revenues,
and total church expenditures to a piddling $3.5 billion,
or two tenths of a percent of business corporation
budgets.
But the real significance of corporations does not lie in
the fact that they take in more money than governments,
universities or churches. They provide the scale of promotion by which most Americans judge themselves to be
successes or failures. Corporate leaders have founded
the great foundations and are among the major benefactors of universities, churches and political parties, to
which they bring the values that they have learned on
the corporate racecourse.
It is no exaggeration to say that business corporations
have taken over the positions of societal dominance occupied at other times by the nobility, the priesthood, the
country squires and the generals. These are reasons
enough for this gathering of juristic leaders to give to the
structure and governance of business corporations some
small fraction of the attention that we lavish on the structure and operation of political government.
The Dimensions of Corporations

If we are going to talk about the structure and governance of corporations, it is essential before we start that
we have a notion not only of the dimensions of corporations in the aggregate, but of the extreme variations
in the dimensions of corporations in particular.
If the assets and revenues of all corporations were
divided evenly among them, they would have assets and
revenues on the order of one million dollars apiece. This
would imply a division of wealth and power not too different from what Thomas Jefferson contemplated, except that factories would be substituted for plantations,
and employees for slaves. But the facts are quite different. There are about two million business corporations in the United States, and they differ among themselves as widely as fleas differ from elephants. Some
have assets and revenues in the tens of billions, while
the great majority are found under a million.
Because of this diversity, many of the statements that
are per£ ectly valid with regard to corporations like
American Telephone and General Motors are implausible when applied to the 99.99 percent of corporations
with assets and revenues of less than a billion dollars,
and complete nonsense when applied to the 90 percent of
corporations with assets and revenues of under one
million . Although the variety of dimensions is almost infinite, we can get a helpful grasp of the subject by thinking of business corporations as distributed among four
types.
At the top of the heap stands a class of corporations
which Phillip Blumberg has appropriately called the
"megacorporations." Their distinctive characteristic is
that they are too big for anyone to take over by a tender
off er , and their shareholders are too numerous to permit a revolu lion by proxy fight. The well-known
paradigms of this class are American Telephone and
Ge neral Motors .
Melvin Eisenberg has emphasized the limited number
in this class by referring to the "AT&T myth." But it is not
a myth that AT&T and GM are immune to takeovers and
proxy fights . And it is not a myth that there are scores of
other corporations which are equally immune . I would
gu e ss the number at around 200, which is about one onehundre dth of one percent of all U.S. corporations.
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These are the great corporations that have inspired
most of the contemporary comment about corporations,
not only the critical comments of A. A. Berle, A. J. Livingston, Chris Stone and Ralph Nader, but also the sympathetic analyses of John Calhoun Baker and Peter
Drucker. Their writings are misleading insofar as they
treat these megacorporations-as "the corporation," or
"the modern corporation." But they are quite right in
suggesting that these colossi set the style for the other 1.6
million corporations and that each of them can by its own
actions exert a palpable influence on the national
economy, and many of them on the nation's foreign
relations.
A second segment of the corporate population might be
called the "available" corporations. They are available
in two senses. Their shares are offered for sale on the
public financial markets, and the entire company is
small enough so that it is susceptible to being gobbled up
by a larger company and vulnerable to revolution
through a proxy fight. In terms of size, most of the companies in this group will have revenues of more than a
million (without which they would not be publicly traded) and less than a billion (which would make them into
megacorporations).
What distinguishes these companies from the megacorporations is that they are not immune to proxy fights
and takeovers, and are not, therefore, a part of the AT&T
syndrome. It does not follow, however, that shareholder
democracy is running riot in their ranks. Most of the time
their managements rule unchallenged and escape the
harassment which consumerists, environmentalists and
integrationists lavish on the managers of more visible
targets such as General Motors and Exxon.
There are a number of widely prevailing misconceptions about this class of corporations, which are often
wrapped up in the loose classification of "publicly held
corporations." One is the assumption that they are coextensive with the companies that are subject to the
reporting, proxy, takeover and short-swing trading rules
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; they are not,
because there are between 15 and 20 thousand companies publicly quoted in the pink sheets, and only about
eight thousand filing annual reports under the Exchange
Act. All together, publicly quoted companies comprise
about one percent of the active business coporations in
the United States. We still have about 99 percent of U.S.
corporations to account for.
From most of the current literature of corporations,
you might assume that the corporations that are not
publicly quoted are closely held. This would be untrue,
if we give any meaningful significance to "closely held."
I assume that "closely held" means held by shareholders who are not more numerous than the thirty
which has been adopted as a limit by the more generous
of close corporation statutes. If that is true, there is a big
gap between the companies that are widely enough held
to be publicly quoted and those which have 30 or less
holders. This gap is occupied by a third class of corporations in which might be called the awkward stage-too
small or uninteresting to be noted and quoted by dealers,
and too large to enjoy the advantages of close corporations. But they are too numerous to be ignored in any
serious conversation about reforming corporation law. I
think there may be as many as a hundred thousand of
them.
Having disposed of the megacorporations, the "available" corporations, and the "awkward stage" corporations, we are ready to talk about the closely held corporations, with thirty or less shareholders. This is where
90 to 95 percent of all corporations are found. They include the one-man companies, the family companies,
most of the subsidiary companies and the joint venture
companies. Most of them are definitely in the small business category, with revenues and assets of under a
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million dollars. In fact , the median American corporation has assets and revenues in the area of one hundred
thousand dollars, and about three shareholders.
Most of the things said by economists and sociologists
about corporations have nothing to do with this set. Their
decisions do not set national levels of employment or investment. The securities laws touch them hardlv at all,
and they frequently ignore the norms of the corporation
codes. This is somewhat ironical, because these are
probably the only kinds of corporations in which it
would be possible to hold a meaningful shareholders'
meeting attended by a significant fraction of the shareholders, with a chance to influence one another's minds .
But instead of using this opportunity, closely held corporations commonly ignore the form of shareholders'
and directors' meetings; sometimes they systematically
exclude the ceremonies of corporate democracy by contracting among themselves on offices, salaries and perquisites .
The Involution of Corporate Control
A second aspect of modern corporations which would
profoundly shock Jefferson and Franklin, and which
shocks a number of contemporary observers, is the
peculiar distribution of power. Since corporations dispose of greater resources than governments, the question of who controls them can hardly be less important to
the general welfare than the question of who controls the
governments of cities, states, and even the federal
government.
The legislative plan, with its superficial resemblance
to political democracy, is well known. The investors of
equity capital control the corporation through the election of directors who in turn appoint and remove the executive officers. In exercising their power, the equity investors are presumed to act to maximize their common
interests as investors-primarily to make profits, but
subject to the same constraints of humanity and ethics
which they exercise in their personal affairs. How frequently this system operates in practice, no one seems to
know. I am prepared to assume that it prevails in the
great majority of business corporations. But we know
there are some very important deviations from it, which
we must bear in mind if we are to make a valid evaluation of corporate structure and governance .
The most notorious deviation is the one that occurs in
the companies whose ownership is so large in total value
and so dispersed in numbers that the investors do not
even try to control the management. This is the
phenomenon described by Adolph Berle , whose expose
probably inspired section 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The irony is that forty-three years later, management control appears to be more widespread than it
was in 1934. The proxy rules may have contributed in a
minor way to the proxy fights of the 1950's in smaller
companies but have had little if any visible effect on the
200 largest corporations which were the focus of the
study of Berle and Means.
A second deviation from the legislative norm consists
in the possession of the largest blocks of shares in the
largest companies by institutional investors. These institutions have all the legal incidents of title, but they
have no convictions about what business the company
ought to be in, or how it ought to treat its employees and
consumers. Their job is just to make a good investment
record. Ralph Nader has suggested that the institutional
investors should solicit and carry out the instructions of
their constituents. This suggestion seems to ignore the
fact that investors who have delegated all their investment discretion to institutions will have even less idea
about how their companies should be run than about
which companies their money should be invested in.
A third deviation consists in the ownership of controlling blocks of shares by other companies, whose interest in the dividends to be derived from the shares may

be a good deal less th an thei r in te res t in other advantages which can be gained from th e affiliation . The mos t
spectacular examples of this phenomenon have occurred , or have been alleged to occur, in th e r elation of
an international oil company to its produci ng subsidiary
in some foreign country-Venezu ela for exa mple. The
parent company ma y have consid erabl y more to gain
from buying the subsidiary's oil at a cheap price th an
from collecting whatever profits would emana te fr om
the subsidiary after splitting them with minority shareholders and with the tax collectors of the host countr y.
The directors of the subsidiary are presented with a
sharp conflict between their duties to the subsidiary corporation and their loyalty to the controlling corpora tion
which gave them their jobs and may be their principal
paymaster.
These three deviations are particularly characteristic
of large corporations, but there is a fourth which is recurrently met in small corporations. The company tells
its shareholders nothing about its business and keeps
such poor records that an inspection of them , aside from
its antagonistic aspects, would not reveal very much to
an outsider and may not give a very good picture even to
the insiders. It is run pretty much as a proprietorship ,
which treats the outside shareholders as poor relations.
Conclusion

The responsibility for suggesting what changes, if any,
are needed in the structure and governance of business
corporations has been assigned to others. But I would
like to offer a pair of observations of how the history and
morphology of corporations should affect our approach
to such changes.
The first is that many of the proposals are made largely
in contemplation of the megacorporations. This is most
obviously true of the criticism of size. But if we look at
the charges of domination of national governments , of
lack of investor control, and of market dominance , we
find they are based on assertions about the megacorporations . Although the proponents of reforms
generally advocate their application to all "publicly held
corporations," they have not laid a data base for that
broad a coverage.
Furthermore, if reform proposals are to be extended to
all publicly held corporations, some thought must be
given to defining the group . The corporations which now
report to the SEC are only about half of those which are
quoted by brokers . If quotation b y brokers is the
criterion of regulation, can a corporation escape it by
keeping itself out of the pink sheets?
On the other hand, there are a number of problems
which are not at all related to public quotations and
holdings. Ignorance of corporate affairs is certainly most
acute not in the quoted companies , but in the unquoted
ones. And the potential for abuse is greatest in the subsidiary companies, of which the minority holders may be
very few . This potential is likely to be increased by the
movement for "going private ," which will deprive
minority shareholders of the few shreds of information
that they now receive.
The second observation is that reform of corpora te
structure is not an invention of Nader , Stone and Ratner ,
but has been going on throughout the histo ry of th e
republic. If business corporations have served America
well , it is not because they have be en left to go their own
way. We should regard corporate structure in the same
way in which IBM views its computers and Xerox i ts
copiers. The y may be the best, but the y are never good
enough. We are not so far ahe ad in th e world wid e ra ce
for industrial and financial leadership that w e can affo rd
to be satisfied with what w e have. We should se ar ch fo r
every means of perfecting the principal instrum ent of
this leadership-the business corpora tion.
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